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THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE IN THE BALKANS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS IN IRAQ
We of today shall be judged in the future by the manner in which we meet the unprecedented responsibilities that rest upon us-not alone in winning the war but also in making certain that the opportunities for future peace and stability shall not be lost.
--Secretary of State Cordell Hull remarks to a joint session of Congress, 18 November 1943 Carl von Clausewitz theorized that "No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his sense ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it". 1 Almost daily, we are bombarded with headlines from media outlets and strategic think tanks that decry the alleged lack of planning for post-war Iraq. Critics of the U.S. occupation of Iraq point to a lack of a strategic endstate. What is the United States strategy for post-conflict Iraq? What is the endstate? What are the measurements of effectiveness or success that define that endstate? What is the appropriate use of military force to achieve political objectives? When does the U.S. declare "victory" and redeploy its military forces from post-conflict Iraq?
Post-conflict operations and their associated difficulties are not unique to the current American military intervention in Iraq. The U.S. has expended national treasure and military forces four times over the last decade to enforce peace: twice in support of international mandates for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and twice in support of the global war on terrorism in Afghanistan, and most recently in Iraq. U.S. military forces have yet to achieve the desired strategic endstate of stable multiethnic democracies in the Balkans. The risk of not applying those lessons learned from the Balkans will be that the U.S. will win the war in Iraq, but lose the peace-with no evident endstate or exit strategy.
This paper critically examines the use of military power as the predominant means to strategic endstates in the Balkans, its failure to achieve strategic endstates, and its application as a paradigm for the use of military force to establish multiethnic democracies. This paper evaluates the ends, ways, and means of U.S. national strategy, using the two case studies of on-going peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Finally, this research paper will propose strategic lessons learned from military intervention in the Balkans that must be applied to postconflict Iraq. The politically-imposed exit strategy negated the critical use of measurements of effectiveness as benchmarks to achieve a strategic political end state or objective.
THE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA EXPERIENCE
Acknowledging the shortcomings of its initial decision, the Clinton Administration extended the U.S. military deployment to the NATO-led Stabilization Force, which has been renewed annually by presidential administrations since 1996. One consequence is that the focus of the U.S. commitment in Bosnia has gradually shifted away from the attainment of an exit strategy for military forces. Instead, the experience has reinforced the key strategic tendency of linking military force structure and missions to quantifiable measurements of effectiveness for achieving the political ends of the intervention, and of avoiding arbitrary (although often politically desirable) exit strategies.
The recent two year debate without resolution on the transfer of the military peacekeeping mission to the newly founded military capabilities of the European Union has resulted in a commitment of NATO and the U.S. to an indefinite presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The promise of Dayton is that "when our forces depart Bosnia, they will be able to do so without fear that renewed violence threatening U.S. interests might one day require them to return." 9 Any total withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Bosnia, however, will likely produce chaos in the fragile nation-building process. 10 should not remain in Bosnia indefinitely, and that the President should work with SFOR nations to enable a U.S. withdrawal of forces. 16 The continued employment of U.S. military forces is a political commitment that they must remain in the Balkans to achieve the political objectives-to ensure the promise of Dayton-and measurably reflects the U.S. investment in peace in Bosnia. Bosnia is the catalyst that shaped the NATO alliance. 17 Peacekeeping operations in Bosnia showed the Europeans that they need the United States. The Balkans experience helped NATO to overcome years of fractionalization and achieve consensus on its mission.
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The U.S. engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in short, is working; it is achieving the end state of a stable multiethnic democracy, albeit much slower than the U.S. had originally anticipated. Advocates of U.S policies point to successes in three areas with implications for post-conflict Iraq. 19 First, U.S. and the European Union (E.U.) are cooperating on the ground in Bosnia. In fact, the legitimacy of the U.S. military mandate in Bosnia is derived from NATO participation, with alliance and international consensus. Second, the exit strategy, linked to measurements of effectiveness in the Multi-Year Road Map, focuses on transition of the mission to the international community, led by the E.U., and ultimately to the centralized multiethnic government of Bosnia. Finally, the restructuring and reductions in military forces, albeit with a smaller NATO or E.U.-led force, ensure continued regional stability and provide for incentives for continued factional cooperation. This strategy reflects the long-term commitment of U.S.
military forces working closely with the international community as a means to achieve the political objectives.
The case study of Bosnia-Herzegovina provides three major lessons for engagement in Iraq. First, the ends of the long-term commitment as based on the national interests of the United States -to establish a multiethnic democracy in Bosnia that does not threaten regional stability. The exit strategy for military forces is a transition strategy based upon measurements of effectiveness for civil implementation. Second, the Dayton Accords and subsequent U.N.
Security Council Resolutions on post-conflict Bosnia provide the ways for international implementation of the accords. Third, the NATO-led alliance and a robust international civilian effort led by the OHR provide the means and international legitimacy to the peacekeeping mission. U.S. military actions reinforce and support international civilian implementation that will ultimately ensure that the promise of Dayton is realized. The U.S. would relearn these lessons during its second foray into military intervention in the Balkans in the Serb province of Kosovo. At the conclusion of the NATO air campaign, President Clinton committed military forces as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force. U.S national objectives in the peacekeeping mission were: 1) insure the Serbs keep their commitments; 2) reduce the risks in bringing home refugees; and 3) achieve the broader challenge of preventing future crises by promoting democracy and prosperity in the region. 23 President George W. Bush has continued the deployment of military forces to the NATO-led KFOR, declaring that the mission is in support of vital interests of the United States. 24 The continued U.S. participation in military peacekeeping operations in Kosovo is strategically linked to the enduring NATO commitment to peace in the region. 25 As they did four years before at Dayton, the U.S. and NATO were determined to achieve a political settlement from the warring factions and a written mandate as the roadmap or ways to end the war in Kosovo. Unfortunately, the roadmap to peace in Kosovo was a significantly more complicated process. Securing democracy in Iraq is the work of many hands. American and coalition forces are sacrificing for the peace of Iraq and for the security of free nations … This is a massive and difficult undertaking --it is worth our effort, it is worth our sacrifice, because we know the stakes. The failure of Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region. Iraqi democracy will succeed --and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran --that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.
THE KOSOVO EXPERIENCE
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And during recent congressional testimony, the head of the Office of Coalition Provisional Authority (OCPA), L. Paul Bremmer, described the danger of failing to achieve a stable and democratic Iraq as a direct threat to the security of the United States. "Either outcome (statesponsored terrorism or terrorists in failed nation-states), or some combination of both," he concluded, "is possible in Iraq if we do not follow up on our military victory with the wherewithal to win the peace."
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The U.S. must synchronize all elements of national power in Iraq while the U.S. military focuses on security and humanitarian missions. Ambassador Bremmer has evoked paradigms of the Marshal Plan of 1948 for focusing U.S. and international aid to create a "stable, peaceful, economically productive Iraq that will serve American interests by making America safer." 46 But in post-conflict Iraq, the question remains concerning the U.S. exit strategy. Some analysts posit that the exit strategy will be contentious to draft or execute, since it will require the establishment of political stability, which is difficult to achieve given the fractionalization of Iraq's population, weak political institutions, and the propensity for violence. 47 In any event, given the Balkan experience, the strategy must be tied to measurements of effectiveness or benchmarks of success for the transition of responsibilities from the coalition peacekeeping force to an international organization or to the Interim-Iraqi government.
Unlike the experience of the U.S. in the Balkans, the coalition of the willing did not have a conflict termination document or subsequent U.N. Security Council Resolution to provide the ways for the post-conflict mandate. At the conclusion of combat operations in Iraq, there was no surrender document from the Iraqi military; no Dayton Peace Accords to guide the peacekeeping mandate; and no MTA or Demilitarization Agreement to regulate the conduct of the former warring armies. Critics were quick to point out that military victory does not always equate to political victory-that in the haste of coalition forces to seize Baghdad and cause the collapse of the Ba'athist regime, the U.S. and its allies did not have strategic plans for the often- When it can, the United States will use military power in conjunction with its friends and allies. It is a matter of distributing the risks and burdens of military action, as well as essential access and support. And in the case of allied action, the United States will have to recognize that its own national interests will seldom be the same in nature, intensity, scope or duration as those of its allies and partners. 52 As it did during military operations in the Balkans, the U.S. would significantly benefit from a strong international civil mandate, led by the U.N., and from an equally strong military mandate, Defense. 57 That was a grave mistake. What has emerged from the U.S. experience in Iraq is the absolute necessity for detailed interagency planning for post-conflict operations prior to hostilities in order to achieve successful endstates and handover the mission from military to civilian responsibility. Unless reversed by future interagency cooperation, the Bush Administrations' failure to conduct interagency planning for post-conflict operations will result in failure to develop an effective transition strategy from military rule to an Iraqi multiethnic democracy. American interests by making America safer." 59 In order for the paradigms to work, however, the U.S. experience in the Balkans clearly demonstrates the necessity of making an effective transition to an international or host-nation civilian capability. The transition strategy for Iraq will be contentious to draft or execute, since it will require the establishment of political stability.
CONCLUSIONS
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The Balkan experience also demonstrates that this type of strategy must be tied to benchmarks 29 Woehrel, 9-10. UNMIK duties include performing basic civil administration of the province; maintaining law and order; including setting up an international police force and creating local police forces; supporting humanitarian aid efforts; facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes; protecting human rights; supporting the reconstruction effort; preparing the way for elections and the creation of self-government institutions; and facilitating a political process to address Kosovo's final status. 30 Ibid, 7. 31 Ibid. The mandate of the KFOR mission is to: 1) to monitor, verify, and enforce the provisions of the MTA and KLA Demilitarization Agreements; 2) in support of UNMIK and the civilian mandate in Kosovo, KFOR maintains a secure environment, supports public safety and order; and 3) provide support to UNMIK and non-governmental agencies within its capabilities 32 
